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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 2000, the Washington Supreme Court entered the
debate over whether a church has a constitutional right to be free from
reasonable zoning regulations when it decided Open Door Baptist
Church v. Clark County.1 Open Door Baptist Church (hereinafter
"Open Door") sued Clark County, Washington, alleging that Clark
County's zoning laws violated the rights of Open Door's members
under the First Amendment's Freedom of Exercise Clause,2 the
Washington Constitution's freedom of religion clause,3 and the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The principal dispute in this
case stemmed from a conditional use permit, which local zoning laws
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1. 140 Wash. 2d 143, 995 P.2d 33 (2000).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof... The First Amendment is applied
to state and local governments through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
3. WASH. CONST. art. I, § II states:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and wor-
ship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or dis-
turbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or in-
struction, or the support of any religious establishment.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 et. seq. (1993). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
prohibited government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion unless the
government could demonstrate the burden was in furtherance of a compelling governmental in-
terest, and was the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. RFRA was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997).
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required Open Door to obtain in order to operate as a church. Unde-
niably, this case serves as a prime example of the increasingly familiar
conflict between a congregation's fundamental right to freely worship
and the power of local government to zone.
Open Door has used the Clark County building located on the
property at issue for church purposes since 1990.' Indeed, the build-
ing was originally devoted to church purposes, but was later used as an
art school from 1978 until first occupied by Open Door.' The prop-
erty was zoned by Clark County under a residential and rural land use
designation. On January 12, 1995, Clark County determined that
Open Door's church site did not conform with the County's zoning
code and issued a notice and order.8 Open Door was ordered to "cease
all business activities or apply for a conditional use permit within ten
days from the date of the notice and order." 9 The church contended
that requiring it to apply for a conditional use permit violated its con-
stitutional right to the free exercise of religion.'°
The Clark County hearing examiner stated that he did not have
jurisdiction to consider state or federal constitutional issues, and con-
cluded, based on applicable land use laws, that the property was being
used as a church without the necessary conditional use permit, and
was therefore a nonconforming use.1 Accordingly, the hearing exam-
iner affirmed the notice and order requirements and gave Open Door
sixty days to file a technically complete application for a conditional
use permit.'2 Open Door obtained review of the examiner's decision
through a writ of certiorari to the Clark County Superior Court by al-
leging that enforcement of the zoning regulations violated its constitu-
tional right to the free exercise of religion. 3 The court vacated the
hearing examiner's order, reasoning that the legal standard that al-
lowed the government to burden religious uses (as articulated by the
5. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 145, 995 P.2d at 35.
6. Id. at 145, 995 P.2d at 35. The previous owner of the property testified in a March 1995
hearing about a meeting that she attended with a realtor and Rocky Shanks, Open Door's pastor.
At this meeting the realtor informed Shanks that the building had not been approved as a church;
the realtor also advised him that the church would have to obtain a conditional use permit from
Clark County in order to secure approval of its use as a church. Id.
7. CLARK COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 18.304A (1998).
8. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 145, 995 P.2d at 35. Incidentally, Open
Door's pastor, Rocky Shanks, was served with a notice and order from Clark County that gave
notice of the following violation: No Conditional Use Permit for church in Rural Estate Zoning
District as per Clark County Code § 18.304. Id. at 145, 995 P.2d at 35.
9. Id. at 145-46, 995 P.2d at 35.
10. Id. at 146, 995 P.2d at 35.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 146, 995 P.2d at 35.
13. Id. at 146-47, 995 P.2d at 35.
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Washington Supreme Court in City of Sumner v. First Baptist
Church4) had not been met." Addressing the conflict between the
power of a governmental entity to zone and the right of a congregation
to freely exercise religion, the City of Sumner court noted that its duty
was to balance the interests of the parties in order to accommodate
both religious freedom and local government's legitimate concerns
over land use. 6 The court concluded that should Clark County take
further enforcement against Open Door to require a conditional use
permit, it would bear the burden of complying with the standard set
forth in City of Sumner, meaning that the county would have to justify
its zoning laws in the case at bar by (1) demonstrating a compelling
state interest, and (2) proving that it has chosen the least restrictive al-
ternative to accomplish that result. 7 Clark County appealed this rul-
ing to Division Two of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial
court, holding that the mere process of applying for a conditional use
permit did not impose an unconstitutional burden on Open Door."
Accordingly, Open Door had little choice by way of this decision: it
could comply with Clark County's zoning laws by applying for a con-
ditional use permit, or it could close its doors.
There is a long-running, national dispute among churches, cities,
and counties over local government's power to use zoning and other
land use laws to regulate religious institutions. 19 In Washington, reli-
gious land use jurisprudence issues have "touched off a holy war."2
Those fighting to keep large churches outside of rural areas concen-
trate their arguments on growth management concerns2' and the main-
14. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982). In City of Sumner, the court addressed the con-
flict between the state's power to enforce compliance with its zoning and building code regula-
tions and the right of church members to freely exercise their religious beliefs by providing
Christian education for their children. The court stated that "where, as here, two legitimate and
substantial interests collide, one may ultimately have to give way to the other. In such a situa-
tion, the court's function is to balance the interests of the parties and, if an accommodation can-
not be effected, determine which interest must yield." Id. at 8, 639 P.2d at 1362. The court fur-
ther reasoned that "[wihen the City, in the exercise of its police power, is confronted with rights
protected by the First Amendment, it should not be uncompromising and rigid. Rather, it
should approach the problem with flexibility. There should be some play in the joints of both
the zoning ordinance and the building code." Id. at 9, 639 P.2d at 1362.
15. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 148, 995 P.2d at 35.
16. 97 Wash. 2d at 1, 639 P.2d at 1358.
17. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 147, 995 P.2d at 36.
18. Id. at 148, 995 P.2d at 36.
19. Eric Pryne, Churches' Land Fight Up For Vote: Sims Seeks To Limit Rural-Area Sprawl,
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tenance of public services, which include roads, water, utilities, sewage
treatment, and fire and police protection.2 2 Because the existence of
mega-churches can lead to urban-level demands for these goods and
services, many zoning law proponents believe counties wisely restrict
the locations upon which these newer, large-size churches can be built.
23 Their theory is that zoning restrictions reduce sprawl in rural areas
and avoid overburdening local government in its ability to provide
public services. 2 As seen in Open Door, without such regulations,
"one could choose to live in a neighborhood for its entirely residential
nature, wake up one morning and find that all other houses on one's
block had been replaced by church buildings, and be left without re-
course."25
Conversely, the Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle is leading a cru-
sade to get churches built, noting that church members in rural areasare clamoring for new parishes. 26 Alexander Brunett, an Archbishop
in Western Washington, has stated that zoning ordinances are placing
a burden on the churchgoer's right to worship freely: "a policy that
stops people from going to church because the only church available is
miles away and is so overcrowded that there is no parking and no place
to sit ... interfere[s] with our right to worship. '27 The Archbishop
warned: "[I]f we are prevented from meeting the spiritual and educa-
tional needs of thousands of Catholics, there will be consequences.,
2
Moreover, the conservation of resources is not the only pertinent issue
here; consideration must also be given to the vast social good that
churches create, like the clothes closets, food banks, and day-care op-
erations. 29 Ron Hart, an ordained pastor for Walnut Grove Commu-
nity Church and a former Vancouver, Washington city councilman,
made clear that church leaders are not suggesting that churches should
be exempt from complying with zoning laws by submitting plans or
permits, but rather that "there ought to be somewhere we [churches
22. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70.010, 36.70A.020, 36.70A.030, 36.70A.070; cf Open Door
Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 159, 995 P.2d at 42.
23. County Can Limit Rural Church Size, THE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 28,
2001, at B4, available at http://www.scattiepi.com/opinion/churched.shtri-.
24. Id.
25. 140 Wash. 2d at 169, 995 P.2dat 47.
26. Pryne, supra note 19, at B1.
27. Alexander Brunett, Editorial Wants to Restrict Right to Worship, THE SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, March 8, 2001, at B6, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/opinion
/archbishop.shtml.
28. Pryne, supra note 19, at B1.
29. Erin Middlewood, Today's Churches Don't Fit Building Mold, THE COLUMBIAN, June
25, 2001, at C1.
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and congregations] can go to build without having to challenge the
whole system."3
On its face, the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Open
Door merely requires a church to go through the conditional use per-
mit process when a zoning ordinance is deemed to pass constitutional
muster; however, this decision actually has far greater ramifications
because it signals a shift in the court's thinking with regard to the free
exercise of religion. Because the court relied on Washington religious
land use jurisprudence, this Note will concentrate on the court's
analysis of that subject. This Note addresses the issue of whether a
zoning ordinance that requires a church to apply for a conditional use
permit, while also remitting a concomitant application fee, unconstitu-
tionally infringes upon the church's religious freedom under article I,
section 11 of the Washington Constitution. In holding that a zoning
ordinance can, in fact, require churches to apply for these conditional
use permits, the court demonstrated a significant shift in its religious
land use jurisprudence. The court misapplied Washington's freedom
of religion test, and in doing so, incorrectly tipped the scales in favor
of zoning laws promulgated by local government.
Part II of this Note provides a history of religious land use juris-
prudence in Washington. This part addresses growth management
laws generally, and where these laws cross paths with constitutional
guarantees of the free exercise of religion. Part III focuses on the
Washington Supreme Court's Open Door decision, separately address-
ing both the majority opinion and the dissent. Part IV illustrates how
the Washington Supreme Court misapplied Washington's religious
freedom test in Open Door and significantly shifted religious land use
jurisprudence. Part IV further discusses how this shift may include
Washington's adoption of the lower federal standard and elaborates
upon the negative ramifications this shift would have on churches
throughout the state. Part V concludes this Note, discussing how the
free exercise of religion has historically been afforded great protection
in Washington, and how the Washington Supreme Court is seemingly
moving in a different direction.
II. RELIGIOUS LAND USE JURISPRUDENCE
In order to fully understand both the controversy in Open Door
and the implications of this case, one must first grasp some of the fun-
damentals of religious land use jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, the
areas of land use and religious jurisprudence have very well-developed
30. Id.
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law. Therefore, each of these bodies of law will be separately dis-
cussed in this section, followed by an analysis that details the implica-
tions of this merger between land use jurisprudence and the law of re-
ligion at both the state and federal levels.
A. Land Use and Growth Management
1. Washington State's Police Power
As a general principle, land use zoning is constitutionally valid
under the United States and Washington constitutions.31 "Land use
planning seeks to rationally guide and coordinate the multitude of
public and private land development decisions which determine the
quality of a community. '"32 While land use planning traditionally ad-
dresses physical developments (and is typically concerned with the lo-
cation and extent of various forms of housing, commerce, industry and
agriculture, woods, parks, open space, public buildings, and sewer,
drainage, and water systems), it also considers various economic and
social determinants.33 The power to zone falls within the govern-
ment's police power, which regulates citizens' activities in order to ad-
vance the public health, safety, and welfare.34
Local governments generally zone under the express legislative
authority of a state zoning enabling act.35 Among local governments,
the delegated police power is distributed to municipal corporations -
cities, villages, and towns - and frequently to counties.36 Cities and
counties that zone under Washington statutes must establish a plan-
ning committee or department.37 Additionally, hearing examiners
may be appointed and may consider applicants for special permits.
38
Under the adoption of a comprehensive land use plan, the administra-
tive body has the power to enact ordinances that, in addition to physi-
cally planning a county or city, temper public problems such as over-
31crowding, traffic, noise, and incompatible land uses.
31. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); State ex rel.
Modern Lumber & Mill Work Co. v. MacDuff, 161 Wash. 600, 297 P. 733 (1931).
32. RICHARD L. SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 1 (1983).
33. Id.
34. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (citing Nec-
tow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
35. Seeid.at 125-27.
36. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND CONTROL LAW § 3.5 (1998).
37. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.63.020, 35A.63.110 (1999)
38. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.63.130, 35A.63.170, 36.70.970 (1999).
39. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 36, § 2.8.
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Although governmental zoning powers are broad and sweeping,
these land use actions are nevertheless subject to constitutional limita-
tions." For example, land use regulations that deny due process of
law are void on the ground of constitutional infirmity.4" Another con-
stitutional limitation on land use regulations is based on the guarantee
of free exercise of religion.42 Accordingly, a congregation has grounds
to object to a zoning ordinance when the law significantly impinges
upon the members' free exercise of religious beliefs.
2. Washington's Growth Management Act
In 1990, Washington enacted the Growth Management Act
(GMA) as a legislative response to concerns over the state's rapid
growth in population.43 The Legislature enacted the GMA because it
found that "uncoordinated and unplanned growth, together with a
lack of common goals expressing the public's interest in the conserva-
tion and wise use of our lands, pose a threat to the environment, sus-
tainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high qual-
ity of life enjoyed by the residents of the state."44  The GMA
articulates broad goals that are designed to guide local governments in
the adoption of comprehensive plans and development regulations.4"
These goals include, but are not limited to, reducing urban sprawl and
maintaining and enhancing natural resource industries.46
Under the GMA, local governments have broad authority and
discretion in land use planning and enforcement.47 Despite the broad
delegation of power, the Act requires six mandatory elements that
must be addressed in comprehensive land use planning: (1) land use;
(2) housing; (3) capital facilities; (4) utilities; (5) rural; and (6) trans-
portation. 4' Additionally, local governments must identify lands for
40. E.g., id. at §§ 10.12-10.19.
41. E.g., Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(holding land use regulation that amounts to a taking requires just compensation); Ackerley
Communications v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905, 602 P.2d 1177 (1979) (finding government
cannot trammel upon guarantee of equal protection of law by treating one landowner less favora-
bly than other landowners).
42. See, e.g., City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 5-8, 639 P.2d 1358,
1362-63 (1982).
43. HELLER, EHRMAN, WHITE & MCAULIFFE, 24 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 18.1, p.
172 (1997).
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.010.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.103, 120.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070.
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public purposes, open space corridors, and essential public facilities.49
None of the GMA's criteria include churches.
3. Clark County's Land Use Regulations
Clark County has developed a comprehensive land use plan un-
der the Growth Management Act. In accordance with the Act and its
goals, Clark County created, among other uses, rural districts, provid-
ing land for residential living in rural areas."0 Natural resources activi-
ties such as farming and forestry are also allowed and encouraged in
rural districts.51
Some uses in the county are neither absolutely permitted nor
prohibited, but are allowed only when certain conditions are met. The
Clark County Code provides a broad range of conditional uses, and
coincidentally, churches fall under this group. 2 Because a conditional
use is not a regularly permitted use, it is thus permitted only upon the
grant of a conditional use permit by a local administrative body."3 The
policy behind approving conditional use permits on a discretionary ba-
sis is based on the premise that although certain uses are desirable,
many are not, and regulation is decided on an ad hoc basis. 4
49. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.150, 36.70A.030(12), 36.70A.160, 36.70A.200.
50. CLARK COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 18.303A.010 (1998).
51. Id.
52. CLARK COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 18.303A.030. The following are conditional uses
under § 18.303A.030 of the Clark County Code:
A. Churches.
B. Cemeteries and mausoleums, crematoria, columbaria, and mortuaries within ceme-
teries ...




G. Private recreational facilities, such as country clubs and golf courses, including
such intensive commercial recreation uses a golf driving range, race track, amusement
park or gun club.
H. Veterinary clinics.
I. Government facilities necessary to serve the area outside urban growth boundaries
including fire stations, ambulance dispatch facilities and storage yards, warehouses, or
similar uses.
J. Private ambulance dispatch facility.
K. Residential care homes.
CLARK COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 18.303A.030 (1998).
53. See Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 Wash. 2d. 143, 146, 995 P.2d 33,
35 (2000).
54. See id. at 146, 995 P.2d at 35.
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B. Religious Freedom Clause
Article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution protects the
free exercise of religion to all individuals."5 The Washington Supreme
Court has emphasized that the freedom of religion is vital, 6 and the
courts have the duty to "ever guard and maintain our constitutional
guarantees of religious liberty, and to see to it that these guarantees are
not narrowed or restricted because of some supposed emergent situa-
tion.., or because the consequences of the impingement upon the
constitutional guarantees may appear insignificant."5" Washington's
highest court has stated that free religious exercise is the rule, and any
burden on that exercise must be the exception.58 Article I, section 11
is to be read broadly in order to achieve this aim. 9
1. Strict Scrutiny of Religious Exercise
The Washington Supreme Court has traditionally applied the
strict scrutiny test when analyzing religious exercise cases.6" Under
that test, the complaining party must first prove that a law has a coer-
cive effect on the practice of religion.61 If a coercive effect is proven,
the burden shifts to the government to show that the law both serves a
compelling state interest, and is the least restrictive means for achiev-
ing the governmental objective.6" If no compelling state interest exists,
or if a less restrictive means for achieving this interest can be found,
the law is unconstitutional.63
To prove a coercive effect, the complaining party must satisfy a
two-part test, which begins with a demonstration that the complainant
harbors sincere religious beliefs.64 To satisfy this requirement, the
complainant must first show that its religious convictions are sincere
and central to its beliefs.65 A court will not inquire further into the
truth or reasonableness of these beliefs.66
55. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 200, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997) (citing First
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 215, 840 P.2d 174 (1992) (hereinafter
"First Covenant II")).
56. Bolling v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 381, 133 P.2d 803, 807 (1943).
57. Id. at 385-86, 133 P.2d 319.
58. See, e.g., Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 785-86, 935 P.2d 1272, 1274-
75 (1997).
59. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 224-25, 840 P.2d 174, 186 (1992).
60. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 319.




65. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 319.
66. Backlund v. Board of Comm'rs, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 639, 724 P.2d 981, 985 (1986).
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The second part of the test requires an analysis of whether the
challenged law amounts to a burden on the free exercise of religion.
6 7
If a law has such a burdening effect, then the enactment burdens the
free exercise of religion.68 The burden on the free exercise of religion
may be direct as well as indirect.69 Thus, even a facially neutral, even-
handedly enforced statute may violate the First Amendment or article
1, section 11.70 If a burden is not found, the coercive effect analysis
ends, and the complainant's free exercise of religion challenge fails.
71
However, should the complaining party prevail by showing that
the aforementioned burden exists, the court must next decide whether
this burden is sufficiently offset by a compelling state interest.72 A
compelling interest is one that justifies the prevention of a clear and
present, grave and immediate danger to public health, peace, and wel-
fare.73 Washington courts rely upon the reasoning of the Supreme
Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner74 to determine whether a com-
pelling state interest outweighs the burden on the free exercise of relig-
ion.75 Under Sherbert's compelling interest test, a law burdening relig-
ion can pass constitutional muster only if the government can show
that the means chosen to enforce its interest are both necessary and the
least restrictive means available to achieve its desired result.76
2. Religious Land Use Trilogy
In the past decade, the Washington Supreme Court decided a
trilogy of religious land use jurisprudence cases that specifically con-
cerned the imposition of municipal historic preservation ordinances
upon churches.77 In all three cases, the court found that municipal
67. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 200, 930 P.2d at 321.
68. Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 371, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1989).
69. City ofSumnerv. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 6-7,639 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1982)
(holding facially neutral, even-handedly enforced statute that does not directly burden free exer-
cise may, nonetheless, violate article 1, section 11 of the Washington Constitution if it indirectly
burdens the exercise of religion) (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 6-7, 639 P.2d at 1362.
71. See, e.g., id.
72. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 200, 930 P.2d at 321.
73. Id. at 200, 930 P.2d at 321.
74. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
75. City of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 8, 639 P.2d at 1363. The City of Sumner court noted
that under the rule of Sherbert, once the complaining party establishes that a governmental action
has a coercive effect upon the practice of religion, the government must then identify whether the
means chosen to enforce its interests were both necessary and the least restrictive means available
to achieve the ends sought. Id. at 8, 639 P.2d at 1363.
76. Id. at 8, 639 P.2d at 1363.
77. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992); First United Methodist
Church v. Hearing Examiner, 129 Wash. 2d 238, 916 P.2d 374 (1996); Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at
192, 930 P.2d at 318.
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historic preservation ordinances imposed an unconstitutional burden
on a church congregation's free exercise of religion. These cases must
be examined in order to gain a better understanding of the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's determination in Open Door, which yielded a
contrary result.
In First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle,7 8 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court answered the question of whether the Seattle
Landmarks Preservation Ordinance79 violated the First Covenant
members' right to freely exercise their religion. In 1985, the Seattle
City Council adopted an ordinance that ultimately resulted in the des-
ignation of First Covenant's church building as a landmark.8" First
Covenant alleged that the zoning ordinance was void as applied to its
church building because the Washington Constitution prohibited ap-
plication of the ordinance to active churches.8'
Applying Sherbert's compelling interest test, the Washington
Supreme Court held that the ordinance impermissibly burdened First
Covenant's right to free exercise in two ways.82 First, it burdened the
free exercise "administratively" because it required First Covenant to
seek the approval of a governmental body before the church altered
the exterior of its house of worship.83 Second, the ordinance burdened
First Covenant financially because it reduced the value of the church's
property by almost half.84 The court held that all financial burdens on
78. 120 Wash. 2d at 203, 840 P.2d at 174. This case is typically referenced as First Cove-
nant II, and was first reported in an opinion at 114 Wash. 2d 392, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990) (herein-
after "First Covenant I". Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court reversed a summary
judgment in favor of the City of Seattle, and granted judgment in favor of First Covenant
Church. 499 U.S. 901 (1991). The case was remanded to the Washington Supreme Court for
reconsideration in light of Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
79. SEATTLE, WASH. MUNICIPAL CODE § 25.12.020(B) (1977). Adopted to "designate,
preserve, and protect .... improvements and objects which reflect significant elements of the
City's cultural, aesthetic, social, economic, political, architectural, engineering, historic or other
heritage .... " Id.
80. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 208, 840 P.2d at 177.
81. Id. at 209, 840 P.2d at 178.
82. Id. at 219, 840 P.2d at 183.
83. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183.
84. Id. at 219, 840 P.2d at 183. Although a religious activity may not be completely free
from governmental regulation, clearly an excessively harsh financial burden on religious activity
could unconstitutionally infringe upon free exercise. Id. (citing Hope Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Iowa Dep't of Rev. & Fin., 463 N.W.2d 76, 80-81 (Iowa 1990); Murdock v. Com-
monwealth, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) ("It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a
going concern." Those who can tax religious practice can make the exercise of religion impossible
to maintain); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) ("Freedom of religion is not
merely reserved for those with a long purse"); City of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d at 7, 639 P.2d at
1359 (enforcement of code violates First Amendment because "practical [financial] effect of en-
forcement would be to close down church-operated school")).
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religious activity, if too gross, may unconstitutionally infringe on the
free exercise of religion.85 Finally, the court held that the City of Seat-
tle failed to show that it had a compelling interest in enforcing its en-
actment of the ordinance,8 6 despite the city's acknowledgment that
landmark preservation laws enhance the quality of life of all citizens.87
In addition to applying the Sherbert test, the court described the
important relationship between the theoretical doctrine and the church
building, suggesting that the two are inextricably related. 8 It found
that "when, as in this case, both are freighted with religious meaning
that would be understood by those who view it, then the regulation of
the church's exterior impermissibly infringes on the religious
organization's right to free exercise and free speech."8 9  The court
concluded that the "church building itself is an expression of Christian
belief and message."90
In First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner, the
Washington Supreme Court again addressed the question of whether
enforcement of the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Ordinance" vio-
lated a church's right to free exercise of religion under the state and
federal constitutions.92 Because of the landmark designation of its
house of worship, First United Methodist was essentially prohibited
from making any alterations or significant changes to the church
building without approval from the City of Seattle.93 Applying the
strict scrutiny test from Sherbert, the court held that the ordinance se-
verely burdened the church's free exercise of religion because it im-
peded First United Methodist from "selling its property and using the
proceeds to advance its religious mission."94 Citing First Covenant I,
the court stated that the practical effect of the ordinance was to require
a religious organization to seek secular approval of matters potentially
affecting the church's practice of religion.96 The church was required
to submit plans to a secular governmental body, which inadvertently
85. Id. (citing Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church, 463 N.W.2d at 80-81).
86. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 223, 840 P.2d at 185 (holding City's interest in
preservation of aesthetic and historic structures was not compelling, and did not justify infringe-
ment of church members' right to free exercise of religion).
87. See id. at 223, 840 P.2d at 185.
88. See id. at 217, 840 P.2d at 182.
89. Id. at 217, 840 P.2d at 182 (internal quotations omitted).
90. Id.
91. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 25.12 (1990).
92. First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner, 129 Wash. 2d 238, 916 P.2d 374
(1996).
93. Id. at 242, 916 P.2d at 376.
94. Id. at 252, 916 P.2d at 381.
95. 114 Wash. 2d at 392, 787 P.2d at 1352 (1990).
96. First United Methodist Church, 129 Wash. 2d at 246, 916 P.2d at 378.
[Vol. 26:365
2002] Limitations on Religious Activities in Washington 377
created an unjustified governmental interference that ultimately in-
fringed upon the church's right to freely exercise its religious prac-
tices.9 7 The landmark designation was, therefore, unconstitutional.98
Finally, in Munns v. Martin the Washington Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether a demolition permit ordinance prom-
ulgated by the City of Walla Walla99 in hope of furthering historic
preservation and aesthetic purposes violated article 1, section 11 of the
Washington Constitution."0 The demolition permit ordinance pro-
vided a "cooling off period" during which the religious organization
could negotiate with governmental authorities or private entities be-
fore a historic or architecturally significant structure was targeted for
demolition.1 1 The Catholic Bishop of Spokane1"2 wished to demolish
St. Patrick's School in Walla Walla and replace it with a new pastoral
center.10 3 Under the ordinance, the bishop faced a possible fourteen-
month delay in the advancement of the project."' The court stated
that "this is not a de minimis delay,"'05 and found that the ordinance
created an administrative burden on the Bishop's free exercise of relig-
ion.'0 6 Additionally, a delay would entail additional expense, and the
ordinance would require the Bishop to attend a public hearing.0 7 The
City of Walla Walla failed to offset the burden placed on the church
with a compelling state interest; thus, the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the Bishop.0 8 "[T]he possible loss of significant
architectural elements is the price we must accept to guarantee the
paramount right of religious freedom."'
0 9
97. See id. at 246-47, 916 P.2d at 378.
98. Id. at 252-53, 916 P.2d at 378.
99. WALLA WALLA, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 20.146.040 (1997).
100. 131 Wash. 2d at 192, 930 P.2d at 318.
101. Id. at 195, 930 P.2d at 319.
102. "The Bishop owns the property, part of St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church, as a
corporation sole. RCW 24.12.010 provides, in pertinent part: 'Any person, being the bishop...
of any church... may in conformity with the constitution, canons, rules, regulations or disci-
pline of such church or denomination, become a corporation sole... with all the rights and pow-
ers prescribed in the case of corporations aggregate."' Id.at 196, 930 P.2d at 319.
103. Id. at 195, 930 P.2d at 318. St. Patrick's School was built in 1928 and was used pri-
marily as a school until 1974. Since then, the parish had used it for various purposes, including
educational, social, and community. The new pastoral center would be "used for religious edu-
cation, outreach programs, parish social activities related to church celebrations and Sacraments,
parish retreat programs such as marriage encounter, renewal, cursillos, and activities of other
Catholic organizations." Id. at 196, 930 P.2d at 319.
104. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 210, 930 P.2d 318, 326 (1997).
105. Id. at 207, 930 P.2d at 325.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 208, 930 P.2d at 325.
108. Id. at 209-10, 930 P.2d at 326.
109. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 201, 930 P.2d at 322.
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C. First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
Although constitutional rights provided by the First Amendment
constitute a floor of protections below which no state can descend,
states are free to build more expansive guarantees of freedom by way
of their own constitutions.110 Indeed, Washington may provide
greater protection for religious rights based on its "sovereign right to
adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution." ' Although the Wash-
ington Constitution's article 1, section 11 freedom of religion clause
provides greater protection than the First Amendment,' the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, in all religious freedom cases, looks to the rea-
soning of opinions construing the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment for persuasive guidance." 3
The Washington judiciary looks to the Supreme Court's Sherbert
test 4 for guidance in these cases, even though Sherbert is no longer
the controlling federal standard."' Nevertheless, this authority stands
as Washington's official standard for free exercise challenges:" 6 when
government action imposes even an incidental burden on the free exer-
cise of religion, the government must demonstrate a compelling state
interest in order to justify the infringement on the aggrieved party's
constitutional guarantee."
7
1. First Amendment Under Sherbert
In Open Door, the Washington Supreme Court reflected upon
three federal appellate court decisions that were decided under the
Sherbert regime.1 The court stated that the cases "are instructive and
demonstrate that the County's action here would pass muster" ' 9 un-
der the compelling interest test. Although these three appellate court
decisions were decided when Sherbert was the federal test, not one of
110. See, e.g., id. at 200, 930 P.2d at 321 (citing First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 234,
840 P.2d at 191 (Utter, J., concurring) ("A truly independent state constitutional discourse can-
not occur if we resort solely to federal jurisprudence in defining rights protected under our state
constitution.")).
111. State v. Gunwall, 206 Wash. 2d 54, 59, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986) (citing Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)).
112. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 229-30, 840 P.2d 174, 189 (1992).
113. Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 Wash. 2d 143, 161, 995 P.2d 33, 43
(2000).
114. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 182, 840 P.2d at 215.
115. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885
(1990).
116. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 182, 840 P.2d at 215.
117. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added).
118. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 164-65, 995 P.2d at 45.
119. Id. at 164, 995 P.2d at 44.
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these opinions applied Sherbert with the same force as the Washington
Supreme Court.
Disregarding Sherbert, the Sixth Circuit was the first federal ap-
pellate court that addressed the question of whether a municipal zon-
ing ordinance that prohibited the construction of church buildings in
virtually all of a city's residential districts violated the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.12 ° In Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, the Congregation
wanted to relocate its church.' 2 ' It purchased property in a zoning dis-
trict designated exclusively for residential use, hoping that the City of
Lakewood's Board of Zoning Appeals would exercise its authority to
grant a zoning exception.' However, the Board of Zoning Appeals
denied the Congregation's application for an exception.'23 Choosing
not to apply Sherbert, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Board of Zoning
Appeals' decision.'24 Although the court recognized the burdens of
the ordinance, which included the increased cost of purchasing land
and the violation of the Congregation's aesthetic senses, it nevertheless
upheld the decision made by the Board of Zoning Appeals under the
following two-step analysis: (1) the nature of the religious observance
at stake must be evaluated; and (2) the nature of the burden placed on
the religious observer must be identified. 12  The Sixth Circuit held
that the ordinance was constitutional because it merely frustrated, yet
did not prohibit, the Congregation's desire to locate a more pleasant,
more convenient and less expensive location. 126 Frustration of these
benefits does not violate a constitutional protection.127
In Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld the denial of a special use permit sought by a church or-
ganization wishing to construct a house of worship on church-owned
property in an area zoned for agricultural use. 28 The Tenth Circuit
stated that when entering the area of religious land use jurisprudence,
courts must be "mindful of the often competing values of free exercise
of religion and effective use by the state of its police powers. "129 In
this case, even though the financial costs to the church were greater
120. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699
F.2d 303 (6h Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 304.
122. ld. at 304.
123. See id. at 304-5.
124. Id. at 309.
125. Id. at 306.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 308.
128. 859 F.2d 820, 823 (10" Cir. 1988).
129. Id.
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because its permit was denied, the court determined that these costs
did not rise to impermissible infringement of the church's religious
freedom. 30 Although the Tenth Circuit applied the Sherbert test, it
held that the financial consequences to the church did not rise to the
infringement of religious freedom: "When the burden imposed by the
government rests on conduct rooted only in secular philosophy or per-
sonal preferences ... the scale always reads in favor of upholding gov-
ernment action. "131
Finally, in Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and County of
San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of a conditional use
permit to establish a church in a residential neighborhood.'32 The
court added a third prong to the test employed in Lakewood: the extent
to which recognition of an exemption from the government action
would impede the objectives sought by the state.'33 The Ninth Circuit
thus balanced the identified burdens to the church and the compelling
interests of the municipality.'34 Accordingly, the court held that the
burdens of the denied action, which were mainly convenience and ex-
pense, were minimal compared to the benefits of the zoning system,
which protected the inhabitants from traffic problems, noise and litter,
illegal spot zoning, and inconsistencies with the land use zoning
plan. 3
5
Given the direction of these three federal courts of appeals cases,
which were purportedly decided under the Sherbert regime, it bears
emphasis that not one of them applied Sherbert with the same weight
and force given to the free exercise of religion as demonstrated by the
Washington Supreme Court.
2. First Amendment After Sherbert
Despite the fact that Washington has adopted Sherbert's compel-
ling state interest test for analysis of religious land use cases, this test
no longer controls First Amendment analysis. 136 In Dept. of Human
130. Id. at 825.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. 896 F.2d 1221, 1222 (9" Cir. 1990).
133. Id. at 1224.
134. Id. at 1225. The court articulated the appropriate test for analyzing a challenge to
zoning laws under the First Amendment.
This test involves examining the following three factors: (1) the magnitude of the
statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief; (2) the existence of a compel-
ling state interest justifying the imposed burden upon the exercise of the religious be-
lief; and (3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption from the statute would
impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state.
Id. at 1224.
135. Id. at 1225-26.
136. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
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Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court placed limitations
upon the use of the Sherbert test in First Amendment cases.137 Con-
gress attempted to overrule Smith by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which restored the compelling state
interest test.138  Sensing Congress' intentions, the Supreme Court
struck down the RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores on the grounds that
Congress had exceeded its power in passing the Act.'39 Thus, Smith
remains good law, and its framework governs challenges under the
Free Exercise Clause. The aforementioned legislative and judicial
jousting is worthy of illustration.
In Smith, the Court lowered the federal standard for free exercise
challenges set out in Sherbert and held that under the Free Exercise
Clause, neutral laws of general applicability may be applied to reli-
gious practices even when not supported by a compelling state inter-
est. 4 The Court in Smith addressed the issue of whether Oregon's
prohibition of the religious use of peyote was permissible under the
Free Exercise Clause."' This case began when two men were fired
from their jobs because of their ingestion of peyote for sacramental
purposes; 142 consequently, the men argued that the Court was obli-
gated to evaluate the case under the balancing test set forth in Sher-
bert.143 The Court refused, reasoning that Oregon's prohibition law
was permissible, and that the State could deny unemployment benefits
based on the religious ingestion of peyote.'44 It further reasoned that a
better approach is to hold the compelling interest test inapplicable to
challenges of valid, neutral laws of general applicability: "The gov-
ernment's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of so-
cially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
public policy, cannot depend on measuring the effects of a govern-
mental action on its religious objectors' spiritual development."'4
The Court reasoned that society cannot afford the luxury of deeming
137. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-i et. seq. (1993).
139. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
140. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
141. Id. at 876.
142. Id. at 874.
143. Id. at 882-83.
144. Id. at 890.
145. Id. at 885. The Court further stated that "[t]o make an individual's obligation to obey
such law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's
interest is compelling ... contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Id.
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presumptively invalid every regulation that causes a burden on relig-
ion.1
4 6
Nevertheless, and in response to Smith, Congress enacted the
RFRA.147 This Act ultimately restored the compelling interest test set
forth in Sherbert, which, when applied, tipped the scales in favor of
proponents of free exercise challenges. Matching the Legislature quid
quo pro, the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA on constitutional
grounds in City of Boerne v. Flores.148  In City of Boerne, the
Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a building permit to enlarge a
church in a nearby Texas city. 149  Local zoning authorities, relying
upon a city ordinance concerning historic landmarks and districts, de-
nied the application. 5 ° In finding the RFRA unconstitutional, the
Court reemphasized that the compelling interest test no longer applies
to free exercise challenges, and neutral laws burdening religion will be
upheld. 5' It concluded the following:
It is the reality of the modern regulatory state that numerous
state laws, such as the zoning regulations at issue here, impose a
substantial burden on a large class of individuals. When the ex-
ercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a
law of general application, it does not follow that the persons af-
fected have been burdened any more than other citizens, let
alone burdened because of their religious beliefs.152
D. Religion Versus Land Use
Washington law provides that in applying land use regulations to
premises where religion is exercised, the governmental entity must
balance the public's need for protection against the institution's free
exercise of religion. 53 In other words, the court's function is to bal-
ance the interests of the parties and determine which interest must
yield. With regard to religious uses, government entities must be
flexible; they have a heavy burden to overcome in proving a compel-
ling state interest.154 Where, as here, two legitimate and substantial
interests collide, one may ultimately have to give way to the other. In
146. Id. at 889.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 et. seq.
148. S21 U.S. at 511.
149. Id. at 512.
150. Id.
151. Id. at S15.
152. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
153. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1982).
154. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 203, 840 P.2d at 174.
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Open Door, the Washington Supreme Court mistakenly weighed
against the free exercise of religion.
III. OPEN DOOR BAPTIST CHURCH V. CLARK COUNTY
The majority opinion in Open Door emphasized that this case
specifically addressed the question of whether a church must alert citi-
zens and their government-through the conditional use application
process-of the church's intention to locate houses of worship in cer-
tain zoned areas where churches are not allowed as a matter of right,
but are permissible under a conditional use status."' The court held
that applying for a conditional use permit did not impose an imper-
missible burden on the church.5 6 Although the court stated that reli-
gious free exercise "remains an area around which government must
tread very lightly,"' 57 the court weakened the strict scrutiny test as it
applies to free exercise challenges in Washington, which will have a
negative impact on religion in this state. In so doing, the Washington
Supreme Court implied that the denial of a permit may be permissi-
ble,1"8 thus setting the stage for subsequent religious land use juris-
prudence cases.
A. The Majority Opinion
The Open Door court stressed the necessity and validity of zoning
as an exercise of police power: "if churches are not even subject to the
application process, they will largely be exempt from zoning and other
land use codes as a practical matter."15 9 The court distinguished this
case from the landmark preservation cases,16 arguing that zoning is
"more substantive" than landmark preservation. 6' Furthermore, the
court reasoned that there was no dispute that the zoning ordinance at
issue was facially neutral with respect to churches.'62 The permit re-
quirement applied equally to churches, most schools, cemeteries, golf
courses, kennels, riding stables, recreational facilities, veterinary clin-
ics, government facilities, private ambulance dispatch facilities, and
155. 140 Wash. 2d at 149, 995 P.2d at 37.
156. Id. at 159-61,995 P.2d at 42-43.
157. Id. at 171, 995 P.2d at 48.
158. Cf. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 143, 995 P.2d at 33.
159. Id. at 146, 995 P.2d at 167.
160. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699
F.2d 303 (6" Cir. 1983). Messiah Baptist Church v. Jefferson County, 859 F.2d 820 (10" Cir.
1988); Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221 (9'" Cir. 1990).
161. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 167, 995 P.2d at 46.
162. Id. at 149, 995 P.2d at 37.
Seattle University Law Review
residential care homes.'63 The court reasoned that while the permit
requirement does not "elevate dog kennels to the same constitutional
status as churches," it does treat churches as all other conditional uses
are required to be treated by the Code.
164
The court stated that it would assess Open Door's challenge in
light of the Washington Constitution. 6 ' In conducting the analysis
for a free exercise challenge, the court held that the first prerequisite of
the strict scrutiny test, that the parties have a sincere religious belief,
was undisputed and satisfactorily proven. 66 However, the court found
that the second element of the test, which requires the challenged ac-
tion to amount to a burden, was not satisfied.'67 The court concluded
that under both article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution
and the First Amendment, Open Door did not meet its threshold re-
quirement of establishing that Clark County's actions caused anything
more than an incidental burden upon the free exercise of religion,
which is not enough to satisfy the test. 168 Although the court did not
conduct a compelling state interest analysis, it reasoned that even if
Open Door had shown an unacceptable burden, the County persua-
sively argued that less restrictive alternatives did not exist beyond re-
quiring Open Door to file applications and follow the administrative
process. 169
In finding that Open Door had not mounted a successful reli-
gious free exercise challenge, the court stated that the burden on Open
Door was merely a "paperwork" burden, which surely did not rise to
the level of religious persecution. 70 Furthermore, because Open Door
"opened its doors" without properly seeking assurances from munici-
pal authorities, it "set up this possibility through an undeniable zoning
violation. ' 171 Agreeing with the reasoning adopted by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, the court declared
"a church has no constitutional right to be free from reasonable zoning
regulations.
' 172
The Open Door court further reasoned that in religious land use
jurisprudence cases, church organizations must make "a very specific
showing of hardship to justify exemption from land use restric-
163. Id.; CLARK COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 18.303A.030 (1998).
164. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 167, 995 P.2d at 46.
165. Id. at 152, 995 P.2d at 38.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 166, 995 P.2d at 46.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 167, 995 P.2d at 46.
170. Id. at 167-68, 995 P.2d at 46.
171. Id. at 168, 995 P.2d at 46.
172. Id. at 165, 995 P.2d at 45 (citing 859 F.2d at 826).
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tions."' 73 The absence of such a showing would be a detriment to all
residents of the affected communities since "a church would be free to
construct a church building of apparently unlimited size in a residen-
tial neighborhood without having to go through a process in which
neighbors receive notification and an opportunity to be heard." '174 In
addition, the court stated that it does not have the power to amend
zoning ordinances: "[it] cannot and should not invade the legislative
arena or intrude upon municipal zoning determinations, absent a clear
showing of arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational or unlawful zoning ac-
tion or inaction."'
1 75
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court in Open Door deferred
to the Court of Appeals below by acknowledging that religious free
exercise is among the protections enshrined by the Washington Con-
stitution.176 The high court reasoned that the previous Open Door de-
cision, which was fashioned by the Court of Appeals, struck a reason-
able balance on the delicate scale between the rights of the County and
those of Open Door.177 Although Open Door ultimately had to apply
for the conditional use permit, the County was required to ensure that
the application fee did not burden Open Door's worship. 7 1
B. The Dissent
The dissent in Open Door proclaimed that the majority opinion
set a precedent that was dangerous to religious liberty. 179 Article I,
section 11 of the Washington Constitution provides for 'absolute free-
dom' of religious liberty. Zoning laws are subject to this constitutional
guarantee, which is subject only to narrow and expressly enumerated
exceptions. 8 In accordance with the Washington Constitution, "pro-
tection of free religious exercise is the rule, and any burden on that ex-
ercise must be the exception. '"81
The dissent further reasoned that the administrative burden
placed on Open Door to apply for a conditional use permit was sig-
nificant, and the burden should therefore have been on the govern-
173. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 169, 995 P.2d at 45.
174. Id. at 168-69, 995 P.2d at 48.
175. Id. at 161, 995 P.2dat 43.
176. Id. at 170, 995 P.2d at 47.
177. Open Door Baptist Church, 143 Wash. 2d at 170, 995 P.2d at 48.
178. Id. at 170, 995 P.2d at 48.
179. Id. at 173, 995 P.2d at 49.
180. See id. at 173-74, 995 P.2d at 48-49.
181. Id. at 174, 995 P.2d at 48-49 (quoting Malyon, 131 Wash. 2d at 785-86, 935 P.2d at
1272).
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ment, not on the church, to justify this burden. 8 2 Additionally, there
was no basis on the record to conclude that the conditional use re-
quirement necessarily protected the public or that these same public
interests could not have been adequately protected by less restrictive
means.'83 The dissent emphasized that the strict scrutiny test in
Washington was adopted to critically review any state action that bur-
dens the free exercise of religion, 8 4 and if the coercive effect of an en-
actment operates against a party's religious practices, it unduly bur-
dens the free exercise of religion. 8 '
The dissent also claimed that enforcement of the ordinance dem-
onstrated a "dramatic, all-encompassing burden" on Open Door's free
exercise of religion. 86 Even if the regulation was facially neutral with
respect to churches, previous Washington Supreme Court decisions
have held that incidental burdens on religion triggers strict scrutiny.
187
First, Open Door was administratively burdened, 88 and, in fact, the
burden was "much heavier" than those in the landmark cases.'89 Fur-
thermore, and unlike many previous religious land use jurisprudence
cases, the zoning authority's denial of Open Door's conditional use
182. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 173, 995 P.2d at 48. At the time the facts
arose, Clark County expressly prohibited establishment of new churches within its borders. Af-
ter the record closed, however, Clark County amended its ordinances to allow churches as a per-
mitted use in some zones. See CLARK COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 18.313.020.
183. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 171, 995 P.2d at 48-49.
184. Id. at 180, 995 P.2d at 52.
185. Id. at 181, 995 P.2d. at 53.
186. Id. at 193-94, 995 P.2d at 59 (stating that "[e]stablishing a church anywhere in Clark
County requires that the religious practitioners must first submit to an expensive and extremely
detailed permitting process of doubtful outcome administered wholly at the discretion of secular
authorities. ")
187. Id. at 183-84, 995 P.2d at 54.
188. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 185-92, 995 P.2d at 33-34. The dissent
listed several reasons why Open Door was burdened: (1) the ordinance makes it clear it is not of
general application but is designed to give "special consideration" to each individually requested
use; (2) the ordinance grants unlimited authority to the hearings examiner to approve, approve
with conditions, disapprove, or revoke the permit; (3) the applicant must prepare and submit
nine bound volumes of plans, application forms, zoning, vicinity, topological, and soils maps,
aerial photographs, environmental information including water courses, soil stability studies,
wildlife habitat information, historic and cultural information, and detail all nearby land use and
transportation facilities, for country bureaucratic review at a preapplication conference, thus
commencing the hearings gauntlet; (4) eight bound volumes of an even more detailed actual ap-
plication for the conditional use permit must then be prepared and submitted at applicant ex-
pense; and (5) the ordinance empowers a county hearings examiner to impose, in addition to
regulations and standards expressly specified in the title, other conditions deemed necessary to
protect the best interest of the surrounding property or neighborhood, or the county as a whole.
Id. at 185-189, 995 P.2d at 55-57.
189. The dissent found that the landmark cases, supra note 77, were similar to Open Door
because, inter alia, the landmark ordinances are also 'zoning' ordinances, and "if they are not to
be justified under the 'police power'-then what is their justification?" Open Door Baptist
Church, 140 Wash.2d at 177, 185, 995 P.2d at 51, 55.
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permit led to significant administrative burdens: "[T]he church was
actually coerced to build and then surmount a mountain of paperwork,
pleading with secular authorities in a preapplication conference, run-
ning a public hearings gauntlet, simply in order to exist.""19 The dis-
sent concluded that it could "scarcely imagine a more comprehensive
and open-ended regulation of church affairs by secular authorities"
than the undeniably burdensome conditional use permit application
process. 9' Second, Open Door was financially burdened. Not only
did the county impose a permit application fee equal to two and a half
months of the church's total income, but Open Door had to pay for
the compilation of the volumes of data required to complete a condi-
tional use permit application."'
In acknowledging the financial burden placed on Open Door, the
dissent proceeded to analyze whether local government had a compel-
ling interest for burdening the church, and furthermore, whether en-
forcement of the ordinance was the least restrictive means of achieving
the zoning law's goals.'93 A compelling state interest must be "based
on the necessities of national or community life such as clear threats to
public health, peace, and welfare."' 94 Here, the dissent argued that
neither Clark County nor the majority elucidated any interest that
would meet this burden.' The dissent further reasoned that the re-
fusal to exempt Open Door from the conditional use process demon-
strated an "inflexible design to burden," but did not speak to "acts of
licentiousness or compelling threats to peace and safety, which are the
only constitutionally permissible predicates to justify the imposition of
such a burden."' 96 The dissent further reasoned that the County did
not show that the conditional use process was the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the state's objectives."'
The dissent concluded by arguing that Open Door had not as-
serted a constitutional right to be free from reasonable zoning ordi-
nances, but rather that it merely sought to enjoy its constitutionally
protected right to exist free of governmental interference that was not
190. Id. at 192, 995 P.2d at 58.
191. Id. at 193, 995 P.2d 59.
192. Id. (stating that Open Door's application must be accompanied by a fee in excess of
$5,500, which does not include the costs to produce the applications when Open Door is a small
community that exists from offering to offering, with a monthly income of about $2,000).
193. Id. at 195-96, 995 P.2d at 59-60.
194. Id. at 194, 995 P.2d at 59 (citing Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 200, 930 P.2d at 318).
195. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 194, 995 P.2d at 59.
196. Id. at 195, 995 P.2d at 60.
197. Id.
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narrowly tailored to protect a compelling governmental interest. 198
The dissent posed the following question: "If religious liberty is sub-
ject to the 'police power,' what remains of religious liberty?"' 99
IV. SIGNIFICANT SHIFT?
Open Door marked a significant shift in Washington's religious
land use jurisprudence. The Washington Supreme Court displayed a
far less protective treatment of church organizations than previously
reflected in other decisions. Consequently, Open Door cuts against the
court's traditional view that the Washington Constitution absolutely
protects the free exercise of religion. More specifically, and as the fol-
lowing analysis shows, the court misapplied the strict scrutiny test,
and in so doing left the future of religious land use jurisprudence in
doubt.
A. How Open Door Was Wrongly Decided
In Open Door, the Washington Supreme Court correctly stated
the test for free exercise challenges in Washington: a governmental ac-
tion does not violate a person's right to the free exercise of religion un-
der article I, section 11 unless (1) the person's religious belief is sin-
cerely held, (2) the governmental action burdens the free exercise of
that belief, and (3) the burden is not offset by a compelling state inter-
est.200 However, the application of this test was seriously flawed. Al-
though the court correctly determined that Open Door embodied sin-
cere religious beliefs,20' it failed to recognize that the test's second
requirement-a burden on this religious belief that is caused by gov-
ernment202 -was satisfied. Indeed, the court held that the burden re-
quirement was unsatisfied even though there were both administrative
and financial burdens placed on the church. 3
198. Id. at 199, 995 P.2d at 62. Justice Charles Z. Smith concurred specially in the dissent,
stating that while he could not "adopt the expansive rhetoric of the dissent," he nevertheless
agreed in principal with its conclusion:
It is my strong belief that our courts must at all times stand as a bulwark between the
State and the church to assure the free exercise of religion guaranteed by our Constitu-
tion. The courts must then be vigilant against seemingly minimal encroachments by
the State which would lead us towards sanctioned government intervention such as
practiced in some totalitarian nations characteristically controlling the exercise of
religion through licensing schemes requiring ultimate approval by secular authorities.
Id. at 171-72, 995 P.2d at 62.
199. Id. at 179, 995 P.2d at 52.
200. Id. at 152, 995 P.2d at 38.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Cf. Id. at 171, 995 P.2d at 48.
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The zoning ordinance at issue placed an administrative burden
on Open Door. Although the previously mentioned historic preserva-
tion trilogy2°4 cases are factually dissimilar, they plainly illustrate the
minimum requirements necessary to satisfy the burden element.
Moreover, the historic preservation trilogy cases support the view that
Clark County's zoning ordinance unduly burdened Open Door. Note
that in First Covenant II, the court found an administrative burden
when the ordinance required that the church seek approval from a
government body before exterior alterations could be made to the
building.2"' Similarly, in United Methodist Church, the court found an
administrative burden when the church was required to obtain city
approval before making exterior alterations.2"6 Finally, in Munns, an
administrative burden was found, based on a possible fourteen-month
delay in the advancement of a church restoration project.2"7
Open Door undeniably faced a substantially greater administra-
tive burden than the churches listed in the three cases above. First,
Open Door faced an immediate burden, where in previous cases, the
churches faced possible burdens. Second, Open Door had only sixty
days to submit an extensive permit application, or it would be forced
to shut its doors. Furthermore, the permitting process itself was an
immense administrative burden; Open Door was required to prepare
and submit nine bound volumes of plans and application forms regard-
ing zoning, vicinity, topology, soil; environmental information includ-
ing water courses, soil stability studies, wildlife habitat, historic and
cultural information; and details regarding all nearby land use and
transportation facilities.2"' Indeed, this process was only the begin-
ning-it merely started county bureaucratic review at a preapplication
conference, thus commencing a series of hearings.2 9 These burdens
placed on Open Door were far more substantial and immediate than
those placed on the aforementioned precedents. Consequently, the
burden should have shifted to the County to prove it had a compelling
state interest for upholding an ordinance that inadvertently violates
the free exercise of religion.
There was also a financial burden on Open Door. Although the
permit application cost of $5,500 may be waived,21° the church would
204. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 203, 840 P.2d at 174; First United Methodist
Church, 129 Wash. 2d at 238, 916 P.2d at 374; Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 192, 930 P.2d at 318.
205. 120 Wash. 2d at 219, 840 P.2d at 183.
206. 129 Wash. 2d at 242, 916 P.2d at 376.
207. 131 Wash. 2d at 210, 930 P.2d at 326.
208. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 186, 995 P.2d at 55-56 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 186, 995 P.2d at 56.
210. Id. at 170, 995 P.2d at 47.
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bear the costs of compiling the data and information required to sub-
mit the conditional use permit application. For a church that survives
on its weekly offering, this burden is substantial.
Additionally, because the Washington Supreme Court has often
based the finding of a burden on future possibilities," Open Door
would face greater obstacles if the County denied the conditional use
permit. At the time of the hearing, Clark County did not list churches
as a permitted use anywhere in the county.212 The burden on the
church would consist of looking for a new site, purchasing property,
again going through a permitting process, and then building a new
church. These burdens are, by any reasonable standards, immense.
Moreover, members of the congregation would face significant bur-
dens; they would be forced to travel greater distances to attend church
services and activities, possibly seek another church, or maybe be
forced into not attending any church at all. The court's failure to ac-
knowledge these hardships indicates that previous protections that
were afforded to the free exercise of religion have been diminished.
Because the court should have found the burden requirement sat-
isfied, it also should have shifted the burden to local government,
which would have then had to prove a compelling interest in order for
the law to be upheld. Without such an analysis, there is little indica-
tion of what the compelling state interest could have been in this case.
The court did, however, articulate its view that the state's police
power to regulate growth through zoning helps safeguard public
health and safety values.213 However, under the Sherbert test, the
court has an obligation to balance the church's free exercise of religion
against the state's police powers. Open Door is a very small church,
which calls into question the need for such an extreme measure of the
requirements of the conditional use process. Furthermore, there is no
indication that requiring Open Door to go through the conditional use
process was the least restrictive means of achieving the growth man-
agement goal. Open Door stated that it would comply with other land
use requirements, 214 and it could have taken other measures, short of
fulfilling the conditional use permit, to mitigate any health or safety
issues.
Nevertheless, this discussion is merely speculation given the
court's failure to shift the burden to local government. However, it
does indicate that the Washington Supreme Court has lowered the
211. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 192, 930 P.2d at 318.
212. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 174, 995 P.2d at 49.
213. Seeid. at 167, 995 P.2dat 46.
214. Id. at 195, 995 P.2d at 60.
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protection that is afforded to religious activities under the state consti-
tution. In order to shed light on the debate between the valid interests
of zoning and religious freedom, the court should have correctly ap-
plied the Sherbert test, shifted the burden to Clark County, and then
balanced the competing interests. Perhaps local government's interest
would have outweighed Open Door's interest. However, the court
failed to even apply the appropriate analysis, which created many un-
answered questions regarding future religious land use jurisprudence
in this state.
B. A Lowering of Washington's Standard to the Federal Standard
More significant than the holding in Open Door, which required
the church to apply for a conditional use permit, the Washington Su-
preme Court implicitly indicated that it is lowering the standard of re-
view from strict scrutiny to the current federal standard for free exer-
cise challenges.
The Washington Supreme Court relied on several federal appel-
late court cases, stating that these decisions were instructive because
they demonstrated that Clark County's actions would pass constitu-
tional muster.215 It has never been disputed that the Washington
Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitu-
tion. 216 However, the plain language of the court's statement with re-
gard to the precedential value of the federal appellate court decisions
indicates that Washington's traditionally strong protection of religious
activities has been weakened. The court, by relying so heavily on fed-
eral cases, blurred the line between the Washington Constitution and
the Federal Constitution. This result will negatively impact future
analysis and interpretation of Washington's religious free exercise is-
sues.
In Open Door, the Washington Supreme Court did not apply the
strict scrutiny test, but instead applied the current federal test set forth
in Smith and later affirmed in City of Boerne v. Flores.217 In Smith, the
Supreme Court held that the compelling interest test was inapplicable
to challenges of valid and neutral laws of general applicability. 211 Un-
der this test, Open Door would lose both the challenge against the
permit requirement and a subsequent challenge based on a denied
permit.
215. Id. at 161, 995 P.2d at 43.
216. Id. at 152, 995 P.2d at 38.
217. 521 U.S. at 507.
218. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
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However, in First Covenant II, the Washington Supreme Court
expressly rejected Smith.219 Initially, in First Covenant I the court con-
cluded that landmark preservation was not a "compelling interest"
that justified the burden on First Covenant's right to free exercise, and
therefore, application of the City's ordinances violated First Cove-
nant's free exercise right under the state and federal constitutions.
220
The City of Seattle appealed, and the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded it to the Washington Supreme Court for
"further consideration in light of [Smith].,,2 1 On remand, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court reinstated its holding in First Covenant I, and
thereby held that the City of Seattle's ordinances violated the free ex-
ercise clause guarantees of the First Amendment and article I, section
11 of the Washington Constitution: "[A]rticle I, section 11 of the state
constitution, which absolutely protects the free exercise of religion, ex-
tends broader protection than the First Amendment to the federal
Constitution. "222 Washington expressly rejected the notion that the
compelling state interest test was inapplicable to neutral applications
of the law, and the First Covenant II court thereby affirmed the Sher-
bert test for religious land use challenges.
The Washington Supreme Court took a step toward overruling
City of Sumner223 and First Covenant 1P224 when it did not find a bur-
den in Open Door by relying on recent federal case law and arguably
eliminated the compelling state interest test for Washington free exer-
cise challenges. The ramifications of this shift are both significant and
unsettling, for this change in reasoning indicates that religious institu-
tions are now seemingly destined to lose land use battles in Washing-
ton that they previously would have won.
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court wrongly held in Open Door that
requiring a church to go through the costly and laborious process of
applying for a conditional use permit did not impermissibly burden
the church's right to freely exercise its religion under the state consti-
tution. Although the court concluded with the affirmative statement
that the free exercise of religion remains an area around which gov-
ernment must tread lightly, and precedent makes clear that closure of
219. 120 Wash. 2d at 208, 840 P.2d at 177.
220. 114 Wash. 2d at 408-9, 787 P.2d at 1361.
221. City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church of Seattle, Wash., 499 U.S. 901 (1991).
222. First Covenant II, 120 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 840 P.2d at 189.
223. 97 Wash. 2d at 1, 639 P.2d at 1358.
224. 120 Wash. 2d at 203, 840 P.2d at 174.
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a church requires a compelling state interest, 225 the court did not pro-
tect Open Door, and in doing so, lessened the protection of religious
activities. Moreover, in relying almost exclusively upon federal court
decisions despite Washington's greater degree of protection by way of
its Religious Freedom Clause,226 the court indicated a shift in Wash-
ington's test for religious land use cases. By not finding a burden, and
thereby failing to shift the burden to the state to prove a compelling
interest, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the federal test and
lowered the level of protection that has historically been afforded to
religious activities in this state.
The Washington Supreme Court must preserve the protection of
religious uses and activities in Washington. Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing in dissent in City of Boerne v. Flores, argued that the compelling
interest test set forth in Sherbert should be controlling for free exercise
challenges.227 She has stated that the rejection of the Sherbert test,
which required the government to justify a law that substantially bur-
dened religious conduct, is supported neither by procedure nor his-
tory.228 She concluded that the decision to override Sherbert "has
harmed religious liberty." '229 Similarly, by not giving Sherbert its
proper application under Washington law, the Washington Supreme
Court has harmed the free exercise of religious beliefs.
The Washington Constitution absolutely protects the free exer-
cise of religion for all individuals.23 The free exercise test in Wash-
ington must remain strict. Open Door faced immense burdens in at-
tempting to exercise its religious rights: the conditional use process
imposed an administrative burden and a financial burden. Open
Door, along with other churches and religious activities in Washing-
ton, has a constitutional right to be free from governmental action that
violates its rights to the free exercise of religion under the Washington
Constitution.
The Washington Supreme Court should re-examine its holding
in Open Door, correctly comply with the strict scrutiny test, and re-
quire the government to justify its infringing behavior when a burden
to religious activity is found. Accordingly, when a court balances
these two legitimate interests, said interests being the free exercise of
religion and the public's need for protection with zoning ordinances,
the free exercise of religion must win.
225. Open Door Baptist Church, 140 Wash. 2d at 171, 995 P.2d at 48.
226. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
227. 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997).
228. Id. at 547.
229. Id.
230. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 200, 930 P.2d at 321.
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